On the road to post-urbanism

The defeat of Viktor Orbán has deprived the European far-right of its most successful governing model. Patriots for Europe remain the third strongest faction in the European Parliament, but they are losing the politician who long managed to connect the state, European funds, cultural wars, pro-Russian diplomacy, and ties to Trumpist United States. The question now is what from Orbán's network will survive without Orbán in the prime minister's office.

When the formation of the new European Parliament faction Patriots for Europe was announced on June 30, 2024, it was clear that a new far-right international was being established in European politics. Their open ambition was to change the EU's approach to migration, green policies, and the war in Ukraine. For the Czech Republic, Babiš's ANO could not be missing, which shifted to Patriots from the liberal Renew Europe faction. The most influential Czech politician thus consciously aligned himself alongside Matteo Salvini's League, Marine Le Pen's National Rally, or the Austrian Freedom Party. However, Babiš never truly aimed for any of these parties. The real reason he joined the effort to build a new strong faction was something else: Viktor Orbán.

Patriots for Orbán

In 2024, Orbán still held a unique, but increasingly problematic position in European politics. He had long governed a member state of the European Union, restructured Hungarian institutions, managed to subordinate a large part of the media landscape, and built extensive economic backing for loyal Fidesz. He succeeded in turning cultural wars into the driving force of his state policy, and many other politicians across Europe tried to imitate him.

For the European far-right, Orbán represented proof that an openly illiberal project could work within the EU both ideologically and economically. Orbán had no problem drawing European funds, using EU membership as a source of influence, and simultaneously attacking the liberal direction of European integration.

At the same time, it was already clear that this highly aggressive model was beginning to hit its limits. Although few could imagine Orbán ever losing power, Hungary faced blocked European funds due to issues with the rule of law, corruption, and judicial independence. Since 2021, Fidesz had been outside the European People's Party and was seeking new anchoring in the European Parliament. This role was ultimately taken over by Patriots, whose unofficial spokesperson became.

However, problems also arose from Orbán's overly friendly relations with Russia. Due to his foreign policy and repeated blocking of EU decisions, he and Hungary became increasingly isolated. When Hungary took over the six-month presidency of the EU Council on July 1, 2024, Orbán immediately embarked on his own "peace mission" to Kyiv, Moscow, and Beijing. This was not an official EU mission. Most European governments perceived it as a solo action that weakened the collective European stance towards Russia.

King of illiberal democracy

Nevertheless, Orbán remained the "king" of the illiberal political current. His conception of alleged conservatism did not reflect the principles and rules of this political current: he handled them purely populistically. His conservatism was nationalism that pretended to respect traditions to attract disillusioned voters with capitalism and profit from them. This, however, long appealed to Babiš, and Orbán was not afraid to call himself a "friend" in public statements.

Shortly after the formation of Patriots for Europe, representatives of individual parties gathered at a large conference in Madrid, wearing caps with the inscription Make Europe Great Again, and decided to build a European version of the MAGA movement. They jointly declared that their time was over. On one stage stood Orbán, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, Geert Wilders, Santiago Abascal, and other representatives of European far-right. They spoke about migration, the Green Deal, national sovereignty, fighting "wokism," and the overall decline of Europe. Donald Trump's victory in the United States was not seen as a distant American event but as confirmation that the same political language could again bring them to power in Europe and steer the ideological helm towards cooperative isolationism and nationalism.

For Andrej Babiš, Patriots were a schizophrenic project from the very beginning. One basic fact is known about the Czech politician: he likes power and is not afraid to flatter it. It does not matter who currently represents it. Babiš can boast of a relationship with Orbán at the same time as he arranges a meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron a few moments later.

Nevertheless, his sudden shift away from Renew Europe, where ANO had operated for many years, was surprising to many. In Patriots, the Czech prime minister deliberately found himself among politicians who did not need to pretend ideological restraint and politeness. Wilders, Salvini, Le Pen, Abascal, and Kickl rely on openly nationalist, racist rhetoric, and stoking cultural wars with the most primitive means. Babiš, in Czech politics, had long presented himself somewhat differently—as a defender of the poor, who sought votes among the middle and lower-middle classes that fled to him after the fall of the Social Democracy.

Joining Patriots, however, placed him into a somewhat different European political family. Into the family of the far right.

The empire is shaking

But only a year later, Patriots, the third most influential faction in the European Parliament, began to tremble in chaos and spasms. The king and good friend Viktor Orbán was politically dead after the surprising elections in Hungary, his ideological stronghold.

Hungarian elections seemed to change the entire dynamic of Patriots and shook them to their core. It was Orbán who was the driving force behind the coalition and its main role model, the face showing the world that this type of politics can succeed. He gave the entire project weight that other Patriots leaders lacked. Marine Le Pen never governed France. Geert Wilders managed to shake Dutch politics but remained mainly a symbol of radicalization. Salvini went through Italy's government but his power was limited by coalitions and the volatility of Italian politics. And long-term, Andrej Babiš remains one of the most controversial figures in Czech politics and has never managed to maintain continuous power over the country.

But Orbán was a different case. He ruled continuously for sixteen years, restructured the state, created loyal media and economic backing, and turned the conflict with the European Union into his own political brand. But it was not only about politics. Orbán was also a model of the peak phase of nepotistic politics. During his rule, Hungary was transformed into a well-oiled machine of money and power, controlled by him and his close friends or family, according to numerous testimonies. Political influence went hand in hand with economic control, reflecting domination over institutions as well as attempts to reshape democratic narratives within a free society. And even this must have appealed to Babiš.

It was clear by the time of the CPAC Hungary that something was beginning to crack in their relationship. Orbán scheduled the Hungarian version of the American conservative conference for March 2026, just a few weeks before the parliamentary elections. It was not just a gathering of allied politicians. During his tenure, Budapest gradually transformed into a hub for Western nationalists, think tanks, conservative influencers, and people connected to the Trumpist movement.

Center of European nationalism

The newspaper Le Monde described Hungarian capital as one of the centers of Western nationalism, where state-supported institutions like the Danube Institute, Mathias Corvinus Collegium, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, or Center for Fundamental Rights played roles. The Center for Fundamental Rights co-organizes CPAC Hungary with the American Conservative Political Action Conference, demonstrating Orbán's importance for the conservative American right.

CPAC Hungary 2026 took place on March 21 at Budapest's MTK Sportpark. According to Balkan Insight, it attracted 667 foreign guests from 51 countries and a few thousand participants overall. Notable speakers included Geert Wilders, Herbert Kickl, Alice Weidel, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, Mateusz Morawiecki, Tom Van Grieken, Martin Helme, and others from the American conservative sphere, including Matt Schlapp. Euronews also noted that independent media had no access to the event and that Donald Trump and J. D. Vance did not personally attend. Trump, however, supported Orbán via a video message. The same—surprisingly for many—did Andrej Babiš.

Friend Andrej explained his absence by the need to address serious domestic issues; only Foreign Minister Petr Macek attended, and Orbán was told in his speech that such people as him—like Michelangelo—are born once every five hundred years. Nevertheless, despite Macinka's efforts, it was clear that Czech-Hungarian relations, at least publicly, had cooled. Babiš, who previously communicated with Orbán in Hungarian, switched to formal English after losing the elections. Despite years of close ties, Orbán was suddenly seen by Babiš as a loser who lost the election. The question remains what this will do to Patriots for Europe and who might replace Orbán as the main link to Russia and Trump’s USA.

Chameleon Babiš

After the Hungarian elections, Andrej Babiš unexpectedly found himself in a new position. Patriots for Europe remains the only currently ruling prime minister of an EU member state. Orbán lost his government, Le Pen and Bardella do not govern France (yet), Salvini is not Italy’s prime minister, Wilders is not the Dutch prime minister, and Kickl does not lead Austria. Logically, this would mean Babiš would take over these European reins and start building new visions and plans for this third most influential European faction. However, this is not happening anytime soon. One of the well-known political strategies of the Czech prime minister is to avoid standing out and always keep even the most bizarre back doors open.

Babiš has no real reason to rush into the role of the new leader of Patriots. It would go against his basic instinct. His entire political career is based on the ability to be involved in everything that might be useful, while claiming that it doesn’t concern him or even that he is a victim of the situation. Babiš can simultaneously be Orbán’s friend, as well as a European pragmatist, a Brussels victim, Macron’s partner, a social protector of pensioners, and a government head with far-right factions in the background—all as needed.

This also applied to his support for Patriots for Europe. He expressed it, but only within limits. Even with Orbán’s fall, this did not change: Babiš clearly does not want any greater responsibility, as was evident at the first "post-Orbán" gathering of the faction in Milan, Italy, where Viktor Orbán was invited but did not attend. According to reports, the Czech prime minister was not among the main speakers or quoted figures. Most coverage focused on Salvini, Bardella, Wilders, Van Grieken, and others, not Babiš. This suggests that the Czech prime minister kept his distance from the most extreme nationalist and racist rhetoric represented by his colleagues.

A new power center sought, quickly

The real weight of the far right is still held by the state. Access to government, ministries, European negotiations, diplomatic channels, and public funds remains crucial today. Orbán was so important for this politics because he could provide all of the above for a long time, functioning bidirectionally. Budapest, in this view, was not just a backdrop for European nationalism but its power hub.

After the Hungarian elections, this address will have to change. Fidesz remains part of Patriots, Orbán remains their symbol, and his network will not disappear overnight. But without the prime minister’s office, he loses something that no think tank or conference can replace: direct control over an EU member state. From the perspective of Patriots for Europe, a more practical question now arises: where does their governing power lie, and what is connected to it?

The answer points uncomfortably close to Prague. As already mentioned, after Orbán’s defeat, Andrej Babiš is the only EU member state prime minister within this "European political family." For the faction that lost its most important statesman, the Czech prime minister has gained new value. An important role in this shift of power is also played by the currently most powerful woman in the Czech Republic, the head of the Government Office, Tünde Bartha. She is even nicknamed Rasputin or the Cardinal Richelieu of Czech politics by some commentators. Looking at her biography and how forcefully she has been exerting her influence in recent months, these assessments are not far from the truth.

Tünde Bartha is a Slovak-Hungarian manager, a key figure in Babiš’s current government. She previously helped establish the Hungarian division of Babiš’s company Agrofert in Hungary, and in 2024 Viktor Orbán awarded her a high state decoration. For years, she has been Babiš’s main link to Budapest and the power clique around Fidesz. Today, she is an influential manager almost constantly at Babiš’s side, traveling with him on official trips, inviting diplomats to the Government Office, and sometimes negotiating on behalf of the Czech Republic. She occasionally communicates with other state officials, including President Petr Pavel.

Slovakia? No, better Czechia

Her good relations with the Hungarian conservative faction suggest that the power center might eventually shift to Czechia. Even though shortly after Orbán’s fall, most European commentators predicted Fico’s Slovakia, because Robert Fico is one of the most fervent allies of the Russian Federation and regularly visits Moscow, including a meeting with Vladimir Putin on May 9, 2026. After Orbán’s defeat, the Slovak prime minister took on part of the role previously held by Hungary’s foreign minister Péter Szijjártó: he became one of the most visible channels between Moscow and the politics of EU member states. Szijjártó’s position was briefly damaged by a scandal involving his calls with Sergei Lavrov. According to investigative findings by The Washington Post, the Hungarian minister repeatedly discussed sensitive EU negotiations with his Russian counterpart, and later released recordings showed debates about sanctions.

Although a new government is now in power in Hungary, the loyalty and history of contacts with Orbán’s era still sustain the Czech-Hungarian relationship. Despite Babiš’s public stance of distancing himself, the position and influence of his key ally clearly show that it will still be important for the Czech prime minister to maintain, even privately, good relations with his former political role model.

Fico, on the other hand, is probably not viewed as highly respected by other far-right European politicians. His government has long been mired in internal conflicts, and protests against him, though exhausting and in many ways ineffective, reveal a deep fragmentation of public sentiment in the country. His governing party, SMER, is also not part of any European Parliament faction, which significantly weakens his position.

MEGA MAGA

While connections to Russia are discussed almost daily in post-Communist countries—mainly because of the Russian war against Ukraine, which is a test and threat for all of Europe—the role of the United States remains somewhat in the background. Yet, the far-right European attitude towards Donald Trump and his close circle is crucial for understanding the dynamics within the European Parliament and national states. Despite Trump’s random and destructive wars, his stance towards Europe and his maneuvering around NATO make the current US an unstable and hardly predictable ally.

For Patriots, however, Trump’s America is attractive for another reason: it offers a victorious image of politics that they have been trying to adapt to European conditions for years, more or less successfully. Borders, deportations, fossil fuels, attacks on universities, independent media, cultural institutions, and language of national pride combined with devastating cuts—all of this strongly appeals to parties grouped in Patriots. This faction also long-term downplays Trump’s economic policies towards Europe.

Orbán—ultimately unsuccessfully—was supported before the elections by Vice President and key figure of Trump’s administration, J. D. Vance, who personally expressed his support and hope that Hungary would remain a close ally of the United States. Balkan Insight described his trip as the last attempt to support Orbán’s weakening campaign. The Guardian went even further: it called Vance’s appearance an open support for Orbán just days before the elections and reminded that the vice president accused the EU of meddling in Hungarian politics, while on stage he called for Orbán’s re-election. Here too, a kind of gap remains, which both the United States and individual far-right parties will try to fill. Given the tensions Trump repeatedly introduces into European politics, this will not be easy.

The so-called sovereignty advocates, who eagerly kick at the ankles of the European Union while freely siphoning its funds and infrastructure, are now in a completely schizophrenic position. The response to US and Moscow policies is not to strengthen nation-states but rather to push for maximum European integration, which sovereignty advocates actively oppose. Trump also plans to strictly demand transparency about how much each EU member state contributes from its budget to defense. And at least Czechia has a lot to answer for in this regard. Unlike their colleagues in the faction who sit in the prime minister’s seat, they have nothing to hide.

Seismic shifts—only a little

In the context of Orbán’s current downfall, it’s not just about the fall of a local government but about a shake-up across the entire center of European far-right, which suddenly lacks a leading figure. And, after all, even the MEPs of this faction realize it. One of them, for example, told Euronews that it’s “the end of an era.” So, the question remains what will happen to the identity politics of Patriots and to what extent they will maintain their international legitimacy.

Sure, the nationalist conservative, xenophobic politics and their representatives have not disappeared anywhere—they have, in fact, advanced. Over the last decade, since the so-called refugee crisis, they have managed to shift the boundaries of what is considered normal and acceptable today. Along with a army of influencers emerging around the famous Identity Generation, they have managed to sneak into politics and public discourse a number of positions that were once strongly condemned.

While in previous years, the politics of the far right provoked widespread resistance and outrage, with the rise of a new, less vulgar and more polished political elite, all previously valid standards have dissolved. Today’s post-fascist proponents do not wear neo-Nazi symbols on T-shirts or heavy combat boots, nor do they have tattoos with SS motifs. Most of them studied at prestigious schools, wear suits, and form youth organizations of political groups like Patriots for Europe.

Looking at the legacy of this normalization, whose main proponent and driver was Viktor Orbán, in a broader perspective, we see a more robust and sophisticated system. And this system will not be easily shaken by a single election, even though it meant a lot in terms of power balance and symbolism. Patriots and their politics do not disappear, nor does the system of power they have built over more than a decade with dedication and faith.

A look into the ranks of their youth organizations sends a clear message: most of them have a very problematic past, often linked to controversies around legitimizing not only far-right narratives but also, in many cases, fiercely neo-Nazi ones. The core of these organizations operates somewhat outside the traditional understanding of politics as we know it from party systems. It relies on a new wave of influencers who attract the attention of young people and thus further amplify their influence on our shared future. Such a thing today does not exist on the other side, whether we talk about the fading European left or liberals. And soon, this could backfire on them.

The culture of nationalism is not dead

What has been built over the last decade, largely thanks to Orbán, far exceeds Hungary. In parts of society, especially among those most affected by recent crises, there is a perception that their interests are now mainly defended by the far right. It is absurd because Orbán’s government clearly showed whom such regimes truly serve: their own power elite, connected business, and political families that turned the state into a source of money and lucrative contracts.

The weak spot of this politics lies where it draws its strength: among people disillusioned with global capitalism, who repeatedly suffer from growing economic, cultural, and social inequalities. Among them, the far right often acts as the only force taking their anger seriously. In reality, it merely redirects it. Against migrants, LGBTQA+ people, women, the poor, NGOs, media, or anyone else who fits the role of an enemy.

The gap left by Orbán in the center of neo-conservative power is small compared to the abyss that has yawned between social classes across European countries for more than a decade. If further groups and generations grow up in such an unequal setting, and democratic politics fail to respond, the most lasting legacy of Orbán’s era will be the persistent shift of some disadvantaged people towards the far right. And this despite the fact that this politics actively pits people who are very close to each other on the economic ladder.

Fueled by hatred towards migrants, LGBTQA+ people, women, the poor, and the disadvantaged, it forms one of the main axes of today’s global far right. Competing with it means taking people’s problems seriously and offering an emancipatory, inclusive alternative. Only then can one genuinely say: perhaps we are finally on the path to post-Orbánism.

The author is the editor-in-chief of the media platform Page Not Found and a film director

Text created in collaboration with Eurozine