Why it is time to upgrade the Turkish-Polish defence partnership

New defence initiatives in Europe, such as the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) programme, have generated considerable momentum. Less noticed has been the memorandum of understanding on defence between Turkey and Poland, signed last year. The document is a modest one, reflecting the decorum of the Turkish-Polish defence partnership: Turkey and Poland are allies, they cooperate in NATO, and Poland had previously purchased Bayraktar drones. Yet the relationship thus far has remained largely transactional.

Nonetheless, the Turkish-Polish defence partnership can and should become much more than what it is now: a powerful bilateral partnership that could shape Europe’s evolving defence architecture. Such a partnership would be in the interests of both Turkey and Poland. For Turkey, a bilateral partnership with Poland offers access to European projects which would address Turkey’s weak spots in air defence as well as offer a great market for Turkey’s defence industry. For Poland, a bilateral partnership with Turkey means that the country’s existing strategy based on artillery and armour – and the NATO strategy in Poland of aerial reconnaissance – can undergo a major upgrade by integrating Turkish capabilities in the field of electromagnetic warfare and drones, making NATO’s Eastern Flank truly formidable.

Poland’s needs

Poland views deterrence of Russia as a primary security objective. This is not just about averting a conventional Russian invasion in Europe, a risk that still seems low despite the bloodshed in Ukraine. It is also about countering the more immediate threat of drone incursions or hybrid attacks. If not quickly countered western capitals could find themselves in the situation of having to decide whether to confront Russia decisively or letting the matter slide, eroding NATO’s Article 5 guarantee.

It is therefore in Poland’s interest that Polish defences are robust enough to counter threats immediately. Accordingly, Poland’s national security strategy advocates deterrence in all domains against Russia. It has also been frequently expressed by Poland’s Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski, who in an address before the parliament (Sejm) earlier this year notably warned against inertia: “We cannot afford paralysis. Passivity or relying on others is an invitation to escalation.” 

Small-scale Russian actions are not a theoretical scenario. A railway incident in November 2025 was identified by Polish authorities as an act of sabotage. In September 2025 there was an incursion of about 20 drones into Polish airspace, forcing the closure of Warsaw’s airport. Only due to the actions of NATO’s Rapid Response Force were the drones taken down. Fortunately for Poland, NATO’s response mechanisms maintain a high operational tempo towards day-to-day threats.

Nonetheless, it is still in Poland’s interest to be able to respond immediately, relying as much as possible on its own resources and to make sure NATO defences are at their upmost capability. As expressed by Sikorski, Poland’s solution to defence is not just being a passive station for NATO systems, but to build a strong military with its own equipment, its own doctrines, and its own inventory.

Turkey’s needs

In this context, there are two dimensions to Turkey’s needs. First, are Turkey’s requirements for its own defence, and second are the interests of Turkey’s burgeoning defence industry, which the government seeks to develop.

Turkey’s defence industry takes a great interest in what is happening in European defence, largely due to potential economic benefits. In 2021, EU member states spent 218 billion euros on defence; by 2025, that figure had risen to 392 billion. The EU’s Readiness 2030 initiative foresees up to 800 billion euros in defence spending by the end of the decade, most of it at the national level, though several significant EU-wide programmes also exist. The largest is the European Defence Fund, the European Commission’s main instrument for financing defence projects, with around eight billion euros allocated under the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework. It is complemented by the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), which provides grants and incentives to strengthen Europe’s defence industrial base and received 1.5 billion euros for 2025–2027. Another mechanism, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement (EDIRPA), supports joint procurement by member states and had a budget of 310 million in 2025. Together, these EU-level instruments amount to roughly 9.8 billion euros.

All this financially dwarfs Turkey’s defence industry. Estimates of Turkey’s defence and aerospace industries’ total yearly turnover for 2025 are about 14-15 billion euros. With Turkey’s focus on drones and other mid-range systems, it is in a position to scale production and export at revenue generating volumes should Turkish firms have access to European funds, their profits would be great. For Turkey, the prospects of sales to the European Union are dizzying in their scale.

Then there are Turkey’s own defence interests. In this regard, cooperation with Europe is desirable. Turkey’s and Europe’s defence industries are complementary: while Turkey specializes in cheap drones and newer equipment to be used in electromagnetic warfare, Europe’s industries specialize in well-established technologies like tanks, jets, and radar systems. Turkey especially wants these to address its big problem: air defence. Weakness in air defence is particularly concerning in a time of high capabilities in aerial offence, as demonstrated by events from Venezuela to Lebanon to Iran.

Indeed, Turkey’s need for air defence is not theoretical. It faces multiple challenges; frictions with the Syrian Democratic Forces, volatile relations with Israel and Iran, and the Russian threat in Europe. Turkey has attempted, with little success, to fortify its air defences. It long sought to acquire a Patriot missile defence system, only to be denied and purchased a Russian S-400 missile defence system, causing some controversy in relations with the United States. Only just now, in March 2026, has Turkey had some success in acquiring a Patriot system – although it is still under Allied command. This likely reflects a pragmatic shift to prioritizing regional security, driven by the conflict in the Middle East. The takeaway seems to be that Turkey’s defence security relies on active cooperation and partnership with its western allies.

 

One boon of cooperation with allies in Europe would be in fighter planes for Turkey. Europe possesses advanced fighter planes, like the Eurofighter, which can deny the enemy the opportunity to launch as well as intercept incoming missiles. As air systems, they can perform these tasks more flexibly than ground systems. The effectiveness of a medium-range air-to-air defence mechanism was demonstrated in Pakistan’s confrontation with India in early 2025. The integration of Turkish and European systems, in particular, the integration of European airplanes and fighter jets with Turkish drone and electromagnetic capabilities, offers a formidable combination. Financially and strategically, there is much to be gained for Turkey from partnership with Europe.

 

Turkey and Poland military cooperation

These financial and strategic imperatives largely explain why Turks have taken such an interest in Brussels. Unsurprisingly, Turkey’s president, Recep Erdoğan, has said “European security is unimaginable without Turkey” or that Hakan Fidan, minister of foreign affairs, said that “a security architecture approach that leaves out a military force like Turkey, would not be very realistic”. Turkey has participated in the European Sky Shield Initiative and Turkey has signed a Eurofighter purchase and training agreement with the United Kingdom. Turkish defence giant Baykar signed a project with Italian defence manufacturer Leonardo to jointly produce drones.

 

Yet the big prize of accessing and developing technologies with EU funding has eluded Turkey. Criteria for membership in major European programmes vary, but often require being a European member state or, as in the Canadian case, explicit inclusion in European programmes as a third country. Turkey is not an EU member state, nor has it had much success in being included as an official third country. Indeed, Turkey was not accepted into SAFE. Yet because of the very fact that defence is not a core EU competency, much can be done in that field bilaterally. It makes sense for Turkey to be included in European projects and the European defence environment through cooperation with an EU member state. EU member states remain free to collaborate with whomever they want in defence and to access EU funding.

 

In this context, a Polish-Turkish defence partnership carries a lot of potential. Poland’s doctrine emphasizes mobile firepower. In terms of airpower, this often translates to buying American jets, such as F-35s and F-16s for offence. For air defence, Poland has Patriot and Narew units. The first counters large scale missile threats; the second, cruise missiles and aircraft. This is a robust strategy, but it still has weak spots in terms of drones and electronic warfare. Poland’s layered air defence – centred on systems such as Patriot and Narew – is formidable in kinetic terms but remains dependent on the integrity of the electromagnetic environment. In a battlefield increasingly defined by saturation, deception, and low-cost aerial threats, as demonstrated by the wars in Iran and Ukraine, the ability not only to intercept but to degrade and disorganize incoming attacks becomes decisive. Those two abilities are what is needed in Ukraine and indeed on Poland’s borders which face the possibility of incursions from Belarus and Russia.

 

It is precisely here that Turkish systems provide complementarity as a force multiplier, shaping the battlespace in advance of interception or strike. On the one hand, Turkey fields capable drones like ANKA and the much-lauded Bayraktar TB2 for long-endurance intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. On the other hand, Turkey has ground systems like the radar jamming and deception KORAL system, and the drone jamming IHTAR. These cover the exact gap in Polish doctrine. Poland has a system for major missile threats, the Patriot batteries; and it has a system for hitting drones and smaller planes, the Narew. These are to be integrated with airborne radar detection, still operating on 20th century principles. Poland and NATO lack the systems controlling and shaping the electromagnetic battlespace across a wide theatre other than classical radar instruments, particularly regarding smaller scale threats like drones.

 

Cooperation in terms of drones and electronic warfare with Turkey also makes sense regarding Poland’s land capabilities, where Poland’s approach emphasizes artillery and armour. The importance of artillery has been a clear lesson from the modern battlefield, which has emerged as the mainstays of the Ukrainian theatre. Poland is investing in deep fires (HIMARS) and sustained fires (Thunder K9 and AHS Krab). With Turkish electromagnetic capabilities, this artillery, already strong in terms of firepower, could become more accurate. As for armour, Poland is building a large tank force, composed of American M1A2 Abrams – one of the most sophisticated battle tanks in use and highly interoperable with NATO systems – as well as K2 Black Panther (with its local production variant K2PL) and modernized but legacy Leopard 2 tanks, which provide a sturdy fleet. Together with this is an armoured personnel carrier force, featuring the KTO Rosomak and Borsuk IFV, both native Polish systems.

 

Yet, the key to effective armour in modern times seems to be in making sure armour is defended against drones. That can be done either by having firepower capable of denying the enemy the opportunity to launch drones, or through technical adaptions, like what is seen in in Ukraine, with cages have been fitted onto tanks to prevent drones from coming too close to damage the tank. Another trend is friendly drones which help defend the tank. Regarding this aspect, cooperation with Turkey in terms of drones would again be beneficial.

The wisdom of bilateral cooperation

Aside from the complementarity of Turkish and Polish weapon systems, stronger defence collaboration between Warsaw and Ankara is a more effective way to organize cooperation than doing things through Brussels. An Ankara-Warsaw axis has the potential to shape the defence environment in Europe and spearhead initiatives coming from Brussels. The reason for this is the restraints of the security policy environment in Brussels, where the main problem is that cooperation in Europe is on a per-project basis.

 

The current system centres on the Directorate-General of Defence Industry and Space, whose main financing instrument is the European Defence Fund (EDF) which finances projects through competitive, call-based grants. These calls are aligned with agreed EU priorities and are designed to incentivize cross-border cooperation. Submitted project proposals are evaluated by independent experts, and successful initiatives receive EU co-financing. The EU priorities themselves are not set by the Directorate-General. Like all EU aims they derive from the deliberations of the Council of the European Union, the European Council, and the European Parliament.

 

There is another more flexible body, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), but PESCO is only a forum where member states propose projects, which others may join or stay out of. Though it designs requirements, joint planning, and regular coordination meetings for projects, little of this is binding. PESCO’s importance lies in the fact that it provides guidelines for the European Defence Fund. PESCO funds are also limited in what projects they may fund and how.

 

New initiatives like the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) would add on programmes to facilitate joint procurement by member states, but do not promise to change the administrative makeup of the system in Brussels.

 

While cooperation with Brussels may be significant for Turkey, the fact that EU funds are generally based on restricted calls, securing Turkey’s permanent and direct adhesion to the European defence framework promises to be a herculean task. It requires masterful deal-making and finding consensus among EU member states and institutions. That is a tall order for any non-EU country: there are fundamental questions as to doctrine and industrial burden-sharing before the question of cooperation with Turkey can be addressed. European Union defence projects must by design favour cooperation between member states themselves before any third country. This is not even to mention the prospect of objections by the Greeks and Cypriots for any EU project involving Turkey. Thus, for Turkey a bilateral initiative with Poland instead is more appealing.

 

Poland should also understand that a sound defensive doctrine requires a strategic vision rather than a collection of haphazard projects. Per-project cooperation, however valuable, does not replace a bilateral partnership with a country that complements its current materiel makeup, like Turkey. Poland would also be hard-pressed in finding a partner that offers a more specialised suite of capabilities than Turkey. There is the United States, but it has prioritised higher-end systems, whereas Turkey has focused on scalable drone deployment. And despite the masterfulness of American weaponry, it is Turkey that performed the first fully autonomous flight of unmanned vehicles – Turkey may even be ahead of the US in drone technology.

 

There are no diplomatic impediments for Poland to pursue closer defence cooperation with Turkey. Poland and Turkey enjoy strong bilateral diplomatic relations, and though Turkey may be less forceful in its rhetoric regarding Russia, both countries support the current NATO position in Eastern Europe and support Ukraine. Moreover, a cohesive bilateral defence strategy is sure to act as a catalyst in Brussels, attracting other actors, countries and companies eager to capitalise on the momentum. Rather than waiting for a centralised EU defence policy to emerge, Turkey and Poland can establish a precedent that Brussels will not only accommodate but also take direction from.

 

Ultimately, it is often better to develop a partnership first than to wait for consensus to emerge. While Turkey’s and Poland’s memorandum seems modest, it provides the framework for a deeper alliance to be built.

 

Onur Anamur is a Turkish-Canadian writer on global affairs, defense, and energy. He is a graduate of Middle East Technical University, in Ankara, Turkey.